

At noon of that day the Emperor's voice had gone out to his people by radio with the words of the rescript, an event without precedent in Japan's history. A few hours later the 5th Air Fleet Commander, Admiral Ugaki spoke to his assembled officers and men.

Our Air Fleet has long been of the conviction that every man would fight to the finish, but we have come to a sorry day. I am going to take off for a crash attack upon the enemy at Okinawa. Those who wish to follow me are requested to raise their hands.

Sensing the imminent surrender, Ugaki had determined early that morning to die crashing an enemy ship at Okinawa, where he had sent so many pilots to their death in suicide attacks. He ordered his staff duty officer to prepare dive bombers for the take-off. Close friends and members of his staff tried to dissuade the Admiral from his plan, but, true to his reputation for imperturbability, his blunt answer was that he "must have a place to die."

Cautious and thorough as ever, Admiral Ugaki stripped the insignia of rank from his uniform, and carried only a short samurai sword. His enthusiastic pilots responded eagerly to the Admiral's query about followers. There were more volunteers than there were planes available to follow the commander. The 11 planes finally took off and, although 4 of them were forced to drop out or turn back along

the way, 7 planes, including Admiral Ugaki's, sent back their "time of diving on target."

Japan's surrender found another sponsor of the *kamikaze* corps in the important post of vice chief of the Naval General Staff in Tokyo. Admiral Ohnishi had been ordered to Formosa when the fall of the Philippines appeared inevitable in early January and remained there until ordered to Tokyo in June. On 15 August came the proclamation of Japan's surrender and that evening Ohnishi summoned staff officers to his official residence for a discussion which lasted late into the night. On their departure he penned a note:

To the souls of my late subordinates I express the greatest appreciation for their valiant deeds. In death I wish to apologize to the souls of these brave men and their families.

Upon completing this last testament in the early morning of the 16th, he plunged a samurai sword into one side of his abdomen and drew it across to the other in complete satisfaction of the *harakiri* tradition. When told of this, his secretary rushed to the dying man, only to be ordered, "Do not try to help me." Thus, refusing both medical aid and a *coup de grâce*, he lingered on in agony until 1800 that evening. His choice to endure prolonged suffering was obviously made in expiation for his part in the most diabolical tactic of war the world has ever seen.

India's Wartime Effort

Digested by the MILITARY REVIEW from an article by Lieutenant General Sir Wilfrid Lindsell in "The Journal of the Royal Artillery" (Great Britain) July 1953.

IN THE light of the tremendous happenings of the war in Europe, in Africa, and in the Pacific, few people, other than those immediately concerned, had the time or the inclination to study closely the extent of India's contribution to the allied effort which culminated in the defeat of Germany and Japan. Yet both in manpower and in

material resources, India's contribution was a major factor in the defeat of the Axis powers. One speaks, of course, of India under British rule and before partition and it would be well to consider what might be the contribution of the new India and Pakistan in the event of any future world conflict in which Great Britain and

the Commonwealth may become involved.

The declaration of war in 1939 automatically involved a United India under British rule in the conflict. In any future world war the new India and Pakistan will be free to decide for themselves what part they wish to take or whether to endeavor to remain neutral. Should they decide, and be able to maintain a neutral attitude, how would the contribution that was India's between 1939 and 1945 be made good in the changed circumstances by the Empire at war?

In order fully to appreciate India's achievement in World War II it is necessary to have some picture of the economic, geographic and historic background which produced the basic conditions against which India's effort was developed.

India's Background

In round numbers India has a population of four hundred million. This population is nearly 90 percent agricultural, it is largely illiterate, it lives to a great extent very little above subsistence level, and it is spread over a continent very inadequately provided with communications. Farming methods are incredibly primitive and her soil drained of its natural fertility, means that India can only support about half her population on her own indigenous production. An annual birth rate of nearly 5 million aggravates the problem. Recurrent famine conditions add to the difficulties. It is believed that in the famine of 1943 more than 3 million persons died of starvation.

In India, twenty times the size of Great Britain, there are only seven ports worthy of the name. There are only 1,000 more miles of railway track than in the United Kingdom, and upon this railway system, during the war years, there were only one-third the number of engines and one-sixth the number of cars that are normally in use on the railways of England.

It is in the light of this general eco-

nomie background and against these primitive conditions, by European standards, that India's stupendous wartime effort must be judged.

Historically, and up to the time of Japan's entry into the war, India has always been faced by one overriding military problem—the threat of invasion across the northwestern frontier. In the period 1939-41 this threat was still a very real one. In those early days of the war nobody knew on which side the Soviet Union intended to fight, and later German penetration into the Soviet Union, almost to the Caucasus, produced a fresh lot of problems in Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan and in the territories bordering on India.

Military Establishment

In view of this historical background, the organization and layout of India's military defensive system, notably in the administrative sphere, had been developed with a western orientation, quite unsuitable for meeting the needs of a military threat by Japan coming from the east. With Japan's entry into the war, India had to turn about and face eastward and re-orient her entire military and air force organization to provide a system of defense for her eastern frontier and for the maintenance of her forces in Assam, Burma and beyond.

Prior to the outbreak of war in 1939, India's peacetime Army consisted of about 225,000 men including British, Indian and Gurkha troops and civilians and non-combatants serving with the Army. The Indian troops were recruited mainly from the north—they came from the small-farmer class and had very little education. This Indian Army was largely unmechanized, and although plans for mechanization existed, neither the necessary vehicles nor equipment were available at that time. Because 90 percent of the population lived on the land, there were available for recruitment very small numbers of men with any

mechanical training or with a mechanical turn of mind. The officer element was largely from the United Kingdom, although Indians were being trained to replace British officers in the Indian Army.

As the Indian Army expanded, it was found that the prewar classes could not provide the numbers of soldiers required, so we had to enlist new classes from all over India. This led to new problems of language as, in the vast area of India there are many different languages and dialects, as different from one another as Russian is from Spanish. These general conditions affecting the Army in India and its wartime expansion applied also to the Royal Indian Navy and the Indian Air Force. The total strength of the Royal Indian Navy prior to the war was about 1,500 men which was rapidly expanded to 25,000 men. The expansion of the Indian Air Force although it started later was of similar extent, and both forces made notable contributions to Indian's war effort.

This describes the extent of the armed forces in India on the outbreak of war. The expansion was rapid, and in the light of all the relevant circumstances constituted a truly remarkable achievement. By the end of 1943 the 2 million mark was reached and was maintained until peace came in September 1945. The steps in Army expansion are interesting. In the spring of 1940 it was decided to raise a field army of one armored and five infantry divisions and by the end of 1940, the Army in India had over 400,000 men.

Military Expansion

In 1941, not only was Afghanistan still threatened, but there was now the added threat by Japan, and demands for troops for overseas theaters were considerably increased. Toward these last requests, India offered the British Government by the end of 1942 four infantry divisions and one armored division subject to the equipment being available and to certain British per-

sonnel being provided by the United Kingdom. By the end of 1941 the Army was about 900,000 strong.

The plan for 1943 contemplated five more infantry divisions and a third armored division, but Japan's entry into the war upset these plans and by now there was a serious shortage of British officers. Yet in spite of increasing difficulties, an overall figure of 1,675,000 men was reached by the end of 1942.

The changes brought about by Japan's penetration into Burma and the threat to India which was developing called for some changes in the expansion plans for 1943 and it became necessary to concentrate more on the raising of administrative troops and services for the development and working of the Assam line of communications and Eastern Bengal, upon which the supply and maintenance of our forces operating in Burma depended as well as the supply to China by air. This latter service was carried out by the United States Air Force but their needs and the requirements of China placed an excessive call on the capacity of the Assam line of communications. The maximum capacity of this line of communications in 1943 was 3,000 tons a day, but mainly as the result of the efforts of the Army's administrative services and the practical help of the United States railway troops, this capacity was increased to 9,000 tons a day by January 1945. The Indian Army's expansion to meet these and similar needs, largely of an administrative nature, brought the total figure of recruitment to the 2 million mark by the end of 1943, at which figure it was maintained.

Comparisons are generally to be deprecated, but when such tremendous efforts were being made throughout the Empire, it is worthy of note that by the end of 1941 there were more divisions from India serving in theaters of active operations than from any other part of the British Empire including the United Kingdom.

Employment of Indian Forces

In the early days of the war, in 1940, units of the Indian Army were deployed in Egypt and also in Europe and in Norway. By the end of 1941, India had two divisions in the Middle East and the best part of two divisions in Malaya. An additional 3½ divisions went to Iraq and Iran; they saved those countries from the Axis powers and secured the lines of communication to the Middle East and later the supply route to the Soviet Union through Iran. The splendid part played by the 4th and 5th Indian Divisions in the early victories in Cyrenaica and Libya; in the re-conquest of Abyssinia and in the final campaign in North Africa and Tunisia were well known. The quelling of rebellion in Iraq and the stabilization of Iran were the work of the Indian Army. The two Indian divisions in Malaya were ill-starred as were all the troops that took part in that campaign. Indian Army formations played a major part in the Italian campaign in 1943-44.

The Fourteenth Army which effected the re-conquest of Burma, provided a magnificent page in the history of the Indian Army and drove the Japanese from their last footing in the British Empire. So from Norway to Singapore there was no theater of active operations in which the Indian Army did not play a part. A small sideline to the services rendered by India is to be found in the epic story of the evacuation from Burma in 1942. The wonderful work of the tea plantation labor of Assam, organized by the planters themselves, in rescuing and succoring the evacuees through what is probably the most difficult country in the world, is a never to be forgotten story. This same labor force played a great part in the building of three great roads which were thrust into Burma for the securing of China and the maintenance services of the Fourteenth Army.

In addition to the fighting forces that India sent overseas, she also sent in 1939 and 1940 her railways—that is the railway

track, engines and cars. This was mainly meter gauge plant and it went to supplement the lines of communication in Iraq and some of it to Egypt. India also sent her river craft from the Ganges and the Brahmaputra. The North African Western Desert line which maintained the Eighth Army was built partly by material from India. The Iraq railway system and the Tigris River line of communications were greatly helped by Indian equipment. When, later, the development of the Assam line of communications became a matter of urgency, India felt seriously the loss of river and railway equipment which she had so generously supplied earlier in the war and which she was unable to get back.

Munition Supplies and Equipment

There is yet another sphere in which India's contribution to the allied effort was of immense importance—the sphere of munition supplies and equipment. Should India's contribution in this sphere not be available for any reason in the event of any future major world conflict, it is difficult to say today from what other source the loss could be made good.

In considering India's contribution in these connections, it is necessary to remind ourselves that India is primarily an agricultural as opposed to an industrial country, and that her population lives on the barest margin over a subsistence level, not only as regards food, but also in all the normal necessities of life—textile goods, coal and transportation facilities. When the barest living standards have been met, India normally has no margin for contingencies, or to meet the excess demands of war. Any reduction in certain types of consumer goods would necessarily lead to a reduction in the standard of living below the subsistence level and cause excessive rise in prices or produce famine conditions. In highly developed Western countries such as the United Kingdom, it is possible to control prices and prevent undue rises

in spite of big reductions in consumer goods. In India, a certain measure of control was possible in the big towns, but it is quite impossible to exercise control over the vast area of India with its great distances and large tracts of undeveloped but often heavily populated country. Any industrial expansion to meet an increased wartime demand had to be implemented with the greatest care, and in every form of development during the war the shortages of coal, of food, and of transportation facilities were dominating factors in what it was possible to produce. In all plans for industrial development and expansion, it was essential to ensure that the demands made on India did not deprive her people of the essential standards of living. Despite these difficulties and disabilities, India developed some of her major industries which, in their own particular line, constituted a main source of supply within the Empire.

Jute, shellac, manganese, textiles, coal, steel, mica, are only a few of the many materials which India contributed to the war effort of the allies. From time to time and often in critical periods, India was able to fill the gaps in the munitions supply of various overseas theaters such as Iraq, the Middle East and Italy, but always under conditions of great strain to her own economy.

The Jute Industry

Calcutta and Dundee, with the latter a very poor second, are the world's two greatest manufacturing areas of jute products. While the Indian jute industry enjoys a virtual monopoly of the manufacturing end of the industry, its monopoly of the raw material is absolute. Raw jute fabric grows only in India in spite of attempts to cultivate it in Brazil, Japan and East Africa. The Empire's war requirements of jute products were, therefore, almost entirely met by Indian raw jute and from the production of her mills.

During the war years, the Bengal mills alone turned out, among other things, 93 million sandbags a month, while the Empire's needs in hessian, camouflage garnish and nets, and grain bags were largely provided by India. During the war years, the average annual production of the Indian jute mills was 3 billion yards of cloth of all kinds, including 70 million yards of hessian for the United States.

The Textile Industry

Half a million workers contribute to the Indian textile industry. This is considerable when we remember that the textile workers of the world number about 14 million. Cotton cloth—khaki drill and shirting material—and tentage were the chief wartime products of the industry. The production was some 6½ billion yards a year, of which a minimum of almost 5 billion was required for civilian consumption in India; this allocation allowed only 12 yards per head per annum for the population which represented a considerable curtailment of the normal peacetime allowance which worked out at 20 yards per head. Almost 1 billion yards were supplied to the government for war purposes and the balance went for export.

India was in a unique position regarding the manufacture of tentage, as she was by far the largest Empire producer. Orders for tents amounting to over 40 million dollars were placed in the year 1942-43 alone. Even then India could not meet the colossal demands of the Empire and United States forces.

India is practically the sole producer of mica and large quantities were supplied to the Empire and allied countries for the manufacture of electrical equipment. For this and other industrial production work, there was, during the war years, a serious shortage of skilled labor. This shortage was universal, and the Government of India therefore set up a scheme for training. Arrangements were established for

training simultaneously some 50,000 workers in a variety of skilled trades.

In the sphere which is more normally understood by the term munitions, India set up 17 ordnance factories, 9 clothing factories, 2 harness and saddlery factories and 2 parachute factories. These factories, supplemented by the trade, turned out 3.7-inch howitzers, light machine guns, optical instruments, rifles, and all types of small arms ammunition, as well as ammunition for 25-pounder guns and 3.7-inch howitzers. Armored fighting vehicles, hand grenades and shell bodies were also produced in large quantities by the Indian railway workshops. India did not produce sufficient quantities to make her self-supporting in these technical items of munition supply, but the amounts produced represented a very material assistance to the Empire's war production.

Conclusion

Enough has been said to show what an immense contribution India made from 1939 to 1945. Should India and Pakistan stand apart from any future world conflict, a new set of problems is produced both in the sphere of fighting manpower and in munitions supply.

Today with the Kashmir problem still

unsettled and the frightful slaughter of the early days of partition still fresh in the minds of both peoples, India and Pakistan exist in a state of armed neutrality, still glaring at one another across artificial and indefensible frontiers. So long as such a state exists, it is idle to suppose that either country would send its soldiers overseas to share in the Empire's battles. Nor would they be in a position to direct their energies to munitions provision outside the normal trade levels and such trade might not be available if an attitude of strict neutrality was attempted.

India has already shown, by her praiseworthy and statesman-like efforts in the councils of the United Nations, to find a solution for the Korean armistice deadlock, that she can play the part of benevolent neutral in the squabbles of the other nations of the world, and this is the role that she will undoubtedly endeavor to stick to in the future.

Pakistan too, may be expected to hold similar views. As a leading Moslem power, Pakistan will be much concerned by the attitude of other Moslem powers who may be involved in the world's future wars, but for the time being at any rate, her first concern and interest will be dominated by her position *vis-a-vis* India.

Technique of Night Fighting

Digested by the MILITARY REVIEW from an article by Major A. Seaton in "The Army Quarterly" (Great Britain) July 1953.

CIVILIZATION in Europe brought with it the development of the art of war. Armed forces became larger and fought as disciplined units. The difficulty of control was recognized, and for this reason battles were fought during the hours of daylight; night action being restricted to ambushes and minor raids. This disinclination to engage in night fighting became even more marked with the introduction of firearms,

since fire power came to play as great a part as shock action in forcing a decision in battle, and for this daylight was an essential.

Most of the great military commanders of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were unanimous in their condemnation of night fighting. Frederick the Great stated his resolve never to undertake any fighting by night, because of the resultant confu-